“Town Meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach” 

                 -Alexis de Tocqueville 

It was with the noblest of intentions that Viceroy Ripon introduced the concept of “self governing” Muncipal bodies in India. They were to act as vehicles of political literacy. Disseminating the procedural intricacies of governance amongst the populace, fomenting  democratic temper in the minds of the citizenry. It was the obstinacy of the bureaucracy, largely consisting of Englishmen who ensured that such exalted ideals never came to fruition. 

Subsequent to the Indian independence, the nugatory efficacy of these corporations arises not on account of a mulish Anglo-Indian bureaucracy but a churlish and discourteous work force as Indian as the chai itself- foisted by the colonialists, but, openly embraced by the populace. This “bovine indifference” leads to litigations like the one which is enumerated hereunder. 

Date of Judgment: 29 July 1980 Composition of the Bench: Single judge bench of Hon’ble Justice Mr. V.R. Krishnaswami Iyer. Lordship authored the judgement with his archetypal aplomb and eloquence.

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the Hon’ble apex court was invoked by way of a special leave petition (hereinafter ‘SLP’) under article 136 of the Indian Constitution.

An SLP can be filed in a case where a substantial question of law is involved or where gross injustice has been observed in the judgement of the lower court.

Substantial Question of Law in the Instant Case.

The Court considered whether they were empowered to issue directions to a municipal body compelling it to carry out it’s duty to the community in a time bound manner.

 Timeline of the lis.

Aggrieved by the nuisance caused due to the inactions of the Municipal Council (hereinafter ‘Council’)  despite relentless requests and pleadings, the aggrieved persons- residents of an area called Ratlam decided to pursue legal proceedings against the Council.

• 1972- Aggrieved residents file a complaint in the Magistrate’s Court. 

Pursuant to the complaint, the Magistrate passes an order against the Municipal Council under S. 133 of the CrPC.

• The decision is appealed by the Municipal Council in the Sessions Court which overturns the decision of the Magistrate’s Court.
• The decision of the Sessions Court is appealed in the High Court (hereinafter ‘HC’) which upheld the decision of the Magistrate Court.
• 1979- Aggrieved by the learned HC’s decision, the Municipal Council  appealed in the apex Court.

The plaintiff’s side 

The plaintiff was aggrieved on account of the following facts- 

1. Malodorous effluents released by the alcohol factory. 
2. Absence of any drainage system provided in the area.
3. Absence of any sanitation facility for the people living on the road, who relieved themselves in the open.
4. Accumulation of dirty water and human excreta as a consequence of absence of any drainage system.
5. Exacerbated Malaria epidemic due to the presence of stagnant dirty water.

In lieu of the above facts, it was alleged that the respondent (council) failed its statutory obligation under s. 123 of the MP Act.

The respondent’s rebuttals

The respondents mounted their defense on the following grounds-

1. Volenti non fit injuria.

The counsel for the respondent (Council) posited that the residents of Ratlam had decided to inhabit the area despite prior knowledge of the unsanitary conditions in the area. This expurgated the respondent’s of any duty in the instant case.

2. Impecunity

Furthermore, the learned counsel contended that the council was bereft of adequate fiscal resources to undertake the task of constructing a drainage system.

Contemporary Underpinnings.

At this juncture, being well versed with the facts of the case and the gravamen of the contentions raised by each party, let us ruminate as to how a similar lis would eventuate under the current jurisprudence.

Are the Courts empowered to compel an executive authority to perform it’s statutory duty in a time bound manner?

The answer is an emphatic yes, the very purpose of law is to protect the emasculated from the emancipated, and there is none more emancipated than a functionary of the sovereign state itself. 

The very purpose of administrative law is to protect the citizenry against the caprices, indiscretions and transgressions of the executive. 

As per the current jurisprudence,  a healthy environment being deemed an essential element of  right to life comes under the ambit of article 21, in the contingency of absence of a healthy environment a fundamental right has been vitiated in the instant case, the extraordinary jurisdiction of the constitutional courts can thus be invoked under article 32 or 226 of the Indian Constitution.

Contemporaneous Underpinnings.

But what was the jurisprudence contemporaneous to the present lis i.e. the 1970’s?

The genesis of the lis was in 1972, more than half a decade prior to the celebrated Maneka Gandhi judgement which had augmented and ameliorated the import of article 21. (This aspect has been dealt with in an earlier blog click here to access it)

Hence, the acts were not construed to be an effrontery to the fundamental rights enshrined in part three of the Constitution. (consequently, the extraordinary jurisdiction which can only be invoked in cases where the fundamental rights have been vitiated could not be invoked.)

More interestingly, the Courts were not sure if bodies like Municipal Councils could be construed to fall under the ambit of “executive” since they were not a part of the government in the strict sense of the word.

(It should be borne in mind that the bulwark of fundamental rights in our Constitution are available against the government (the executive and the legislature in a very loose sense.)

The Ratio Decidendi

On the question whether the Courts were empowered to pass an order impelling the Municipal Council into action.

The Hon’ble apex Court held that compliance with orders of a judicial magistrate was mandatory. This was on account of the imperative tone of S. 133 of the CrPC read in conjunction with the punitive temper of S. 188 of the IPC.

Significance of the Judgement

Having acquainted ourselves with the backdrop of the nebulous jurisprudence in such cases, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the Ratlam judgement proved to be an invaluable catena in crystallizing the amorphous jurisprudence in the 1970’s to how the judiciary deal with such cases today. The present writer refers to this judgement as a catena because the more tangible “doctrine of instrumentality” was devised by the same judge four months after the current case in the case of Som Prakash Rekhi which will be dealt with in the next blog.

Key Take Aways from the Judgement.

The Social Justice Aspect of the case.

The intense squalor of the people living on the streets was exacerbated on account of the noxious effluents from the alcohol factory.  In essence, the already bad condition of the poor people was made worse at the hands of the rich capitalists.

This offends the fundamentals canons of social justice enshrined in the very preamble of the Indian constitution. 

Lack of Sensitivity especially in the Lower Level Bureaucracy

A cursory reading of the order passed by the Magistrate reveals the non application of judicial mind. Albeit, the final order against the Council was laudable for the alacrity and adroitness with which the case was handled, the fraught phraseology of the order is reproachful. The magistrate insisted on construction of the drainage system system since “educated and cultured” people resided in the New Road area. He furthermore emphasized on the importance of the area due to its proximity with the railway station.

This begs the question whether the proprietorship of a residence in an important area is the touchdtone for being “cultured” and does this bestow them with human rights transcendental to those of an “uneducated and uncultured” woman, say, a poor tribal forest dweller? Is the “activated tort consciousness” of the more legally aware populace necessary for securing even the most basic human rights?

It can said that the magistrate applied legal mind but not judicial mind. The present author postulates that this might be on account of the lack of judicial training of the magistrate. The complaint was filed in 1972, prior to the enactment of the new Code of Criminal Procedure which bifurcated the offices of a judicial magistrate from that of an executive magistrate.

Constitution as a guiding light in novel interpretations.

 The CrPC and IPC are legislations of a colonial milieu. The Indian Constitution has helped in interpreting them in a welfare oriented manner. Thus the wide array of powers bestowed in the magistrates can be invoked for the benefit of the people.

Problems Still Blight the System. 

Despite robust legal provisions, lackadaisical enforcement of these legal provisions still poses a challenge. 

There is a pervasive culture of statutory ignorance amongst the custodians of law itself. It is unsurprising that despite subsequent to the enactment of a robust legislation like the Domestic Violence Act, the protection officers are non conversant with the procedure to be followed in cases where a female has been physically assaulted.

It should be pointed out that post 73rd and 74th Amendments the Municipal Corporations and Panchayats have been armed with numerous enabling provisions which has allowed them to undertake projects beneficial for the masses. The contours of these provisions will be delineated in the blog subsequent to the blog on the Som Prakash Lekhi judgement where Justice Iyer evolved the Doctrine of Instrumentality.

A temporal analysis would also reveal that the judicial innovations in the present judgment were stifled since the Court adopted a more mellow stance on the question of punishing the Council for contempt of court on account of non compliance with the present judgment. For the sake of brevity the author will not delve into this argument. However, the jurisprudential evolution due to this case can hardly be disputed